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WHAT ATKINS COULD MEAN FOR PEOPLE WITH
MENTAL ILLNESS
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN*
INTRODUCTION
This essay expands on an argument I briefly made a few years ago,' to the effect
that states that prohibit execution of mentally retarded people or juveniles violate the
Equal Protection Clause if they continue to authorize imposition of the death penalty
on people with mental illness. At the time the earlier article was written, only
thirteen states banned execution of people with retardation,2 and a somewhat greater
number prohibited execution of children under sixteen.3 Now, of course, thanks to
Jim Ellis et al. 4 and the Supreme Court's decision in Atkins v. Virginia,5 no state is
permitted to impose a death sentence on someone who suffers from mental
retardation. While the constitutional status of imposing the death penalty on children
remains somewhat murky,6 the holding in Atkins barring execution of people with
retardation, by itself, should dictate that execution of people who were suffering
from serious mental illness at the time of their offense is also banned nationwide,
if the equal protection argument is accepted.
One hurdle for this argument is likely to be the Supreme Court's consistent
holding that laws that differentiate based on disability need only meet the "rational
basis" test, which is generally an extremely easy test to meet.7 But that hurdle might
not be as significant as many think. First, read carefully, the Supreme Court's equal
protection case law can be said to require not only a plausible reason but a good
reason for discrimination based on disability. 8 Second, if-as Atkins seems to
indicate-the most important factors in determining which murderers may be put
to death are relative culpability and deterrability, there may even not be any
plausiblereasons for differentiating between execution of people with mental illness
and execution of people with mental retardation or juveniles. 9 Finally, it is worth
noting that the death penalty is a special context that often produces surprising
results; after all, as recently as two years ago, very few people would have predicted
Atkins would be decided the way it was.

* Stephen C. O'Connell Professor of Law, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law. I would
like to thank James Ellis, Joseph Jackson, Lars Noah, and various members of the audience at the New Mexico Law
Review's Symposium on Atkins, October 2002, for their comments on the ideas expressed in this essay.
1. See Christopher Slobogin, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty, 1 CAL. CRIM. L. REV., art. 3, I[ 5-13
(2000), available at http://www.boalt.org/CCLR/vl/vltoc.htm; 24 MEN. & PHYS. Dis. L. REP. 667, 667-69 (2000)
(subsequent citations will be to the latter version).
2. Id. at 667.
3. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 829 (1988) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (reporting that,
as of 1988, eighteen states had adopted such a prohibition).
4. Together with Charles E. Haden and Robert E. Lee, James Ellis, Professor at the University of New
Mexico School of Law, wrote the briefs for Daryl Renard Atkins. Professor Ellis's heroic efforts on behalf of people
with mental retardation, in and out of the death penalty context, are well-known. He was involved in all three
prominent equal protection cases involving mental disability. See infra notes 43-74.
5. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 38-39.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 47-50.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 43-76.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 77-136.
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Part I of this essay examines the Court's Eighth Amendment analysis, not only
in Atkins, but also in Thompson v. Oklahoma,'° which intimates that the Court will
eventually prohibit execution of children in their mid-teens and below. It concludes
that the best explanation for these decisions is the Court's recognition that
developmentally disabled and youthful murderers are less culpable and less
deterrable than the average murderer. On the assumption that the same can be said
for people with significant mental illness who commit murder, part II looks at the
Court's Equal Protection case law to determine how persuasive the evidence of
similarity must be in order to enforce a ban on execution of people with mental
illness. Finally, part II investigates more thoroughly how similar the three groups
are, not just in terms of relative culpability and deterrability but also with respect to
other possibly relevant variables, such as ease of identification and dangerousness.
The ultimate conclusion is that distinguishing between people with significant
mental illness, people with mental retardation, and juveniles in the application of
capital punishment violates the Equal Protection Clause.
I. EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
Ever since Trop v. Dulles," the Court has held that the Eighth Amendment's ban
on "cruel and unusual" punishment "must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."' 12 When the
Court has gone looking for these "evolving standards," it has generally focused on
the judgments of state legislatures as the most "objective" measure of American
values.' 3 It did so in Atkins as well and relied heavily on the fact that eighteen of the
thirty-eight states that have the death penalty have outlawed execution of people
with mental retardation in the past fourteen years.' 4 The majority also found
evidence of consensus in the low number of people with retardation actually
executed and in the opinions of a wide array of organizations and of people
surveyed in polls.' 5
As Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion pointed out, however, this evidence is not
very impressive when compared to the level of consensus typically required in
Eighth Amendment cases. Most significantly, the proportion of states that prohibited
execution of those with retardation prior to Atkins was positively paltry compared
legislative rejection of practices the Court has labeled
to the usually overwhelming
"cruel and unusual."' 6 In Scalia's words, "[w]hat the Court calls evidence of

10. 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion).
1I. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
12. Id. at 100-01.

13. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 (1991) (evolving standards should be informed by
"objective factors to the maximum possible extent'); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989) ("[the] clearest
and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's
legislatures").
14. 536 U.S. at 313-15.
15. Id. at 316 ("[lIt appears that even among those States that regularly execute offenders and that have no
prohibition with regard to the mentally retarded, only five have executed offenders possessing a known IQ less than
70 since we decided Penry."); id. at n.21 (listing national and international organizations).
16. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (finding only one state permitted the death penalty for
rape); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (stating only one state permitted a life sentence without parole for the
types of crimes at issue); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (noting no state authorized execution of those
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'consensus' in the present case (a fudged forty-seven percent) more closely
resembles evidence that we found inadequate to establish consensus in earlier
cases."' 7 Scalia was equally dismissive of the majority's other evidence of
consensus. He disputed the majority's assumption that executions of people with
mental retardation are rare, 8 and noted that, even if this were so, it likely resulted
from the fact that mental retardation is a constitutionally mandated mitigating
factor, 9 rather than from the stance that people with retardation should be immune
from execution under all circumstances.2 ° To the majority's reliance on non-legal
sources of support for such a ban he awarded "the Prize for the Court's most Feeble
Effort to fabricate 'national consensus' ,21 and cross-referenced to Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion questioning the methodology of the polls and the
representativeness of professional and religious organizations. 2
In the context of these rebuttals, which have some bite to them, the most crucial
statement in Justice Stevens' majority opinion might be the following: "[O]bjective
evidence, though of great importance, [does] not 'wholly determine' the
controversy, 'for the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment
will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty
under the Eighth Amendment.' ' 2 3 Although other cases had adopted the same
position (the subquotation comes from Coker v. Georgia24), the gist of those
opinions was that the Court's judgment can only confirm popular consensus, not
trump it.2 In these earlier cases, the opinion of the Court on the matter was largely
makeweight.26 In Atkins, in contrast, one gets the sense that the Court's

who are incompetent); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (finding only eight out of thirty-six death penalty
states permitted the death penalty for a robbery in which an accomplice took a life).
17. 536 U.S. at 343 (emphasis added). Scalia's use of the word "fudged" referred to the fact that one of the
eighteen state laws relied on by the majority, New York's, continued to permit execution of persons with mental
retardation who committed murder "while the defendant was confined or under custody in a state correctional
facility or local correctional institution," N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27.12(d) (McKinney 2001-2002 Interim
Pocket Part), and the additional fact that eleven states prohibited execution of those with mental retardation only
if the murder occurred after the effective date of the statute. Id. at 323-24. Scalia then noted that the Court had
upheld the death penalty for major participation in a felony with reckless indifference to life when eleven of thirtyseven death penalty states (thirty percent) prohibited such punishment, Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), and
for people who commit murder at age sixteen when fifteen of thirty-six (forty-two percent) death penalty states
prohibited capital punishment for such offenders. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
18. 536 U.S. at 346 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reporting, inter alia, a source that indicated that ten percent of
those on death row suffer from mental retardation). Other reports estimate up to thirty percent of those on death row
have mental retardation. See, e.g., Clive A. Stafford-Smith & Remy Voisin Stains, Folly by Fiat: Pretending that
Death Row Inmates Can Represent Themselves in Post-Conviction Proceedings, 45 LoY. L. REV. 55, 70 n.92
(1999).
19. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
20. 536 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 321-36 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 312 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)).
24. 433 U.S. at 597.
25. In Coker itself, for instance, the Court made the quoted statement after noting that the national legislative
consensus was clearly against imposing the death penalty for rape. Id. It then went on to state, "the legislative
rejection of capital punishment for rape strongly confirms our own judgment, which is that death is indeed a
disproportionate penalty for the crime of raping an adult woman." Id.
26. As the Court stated in Stanford v. Kentucky,
To say, as the dissent says, that "it is for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment
permits imposition of the death penalty,"-and to mean that as the dissent means it, i.e., that it
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"independent evaluation,' 27 to use Stevens' language, was more important in
justifying the decision than the legislative nose-counting. Indeed, in light of the
relatively slim legislative consensus against execution of people with retardation,
Scalia called this evaluation "[t]he genuinely operative portion of the opinion. ' '28
While this latter remark may be an overstatement, there is no doubt that the
majority's "independent evaluation" is an essential part of the opinion. For present
purposes, its importance lies in the clues it provides as to how the Supreme Court
evaluates the proper scope of the death penalty as it applies to people with mental
disability. The core of this evaluation in Atkins was that, because people with mental
retardation have "diminished capacities to understand and process information, to
communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in
logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others,"29
their execution does not "measurably contribute[]" to either the retributive or the
deterrence goal of capital punishment." Noting that precedent had established that
the death penalty was reserved for the most culpable murderers, Stevens stated, "the
lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form
of retribution."' Similarly, compared to the typical person who contemplates
murder, people with mental retardation are "less likely [to] process the information
of the possibility32of execution as a penalty" and thus less likely to be deterred by
that information.
Fourteen years earlier, a four-member plurality of the Court engaged in a similar
analysis in concluding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of juveniles

is for us to judge, not on the basis of what we perceive the Eighth Amendment originally
prohibited, or on the basis of what we perceive the society through its democratic processes now
overwhelmingly disapproves, but on the basis of what we think "proportionate" and "measurably
contributory to acceptable goals of punishment"-to say and mean that, is to replace judges of
the law with a committee of philosopher-kings.
492 U.S. 361, 379 (1989).
27. 536U.S.at321.
28. Id. at 349 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 318.
30. The Court's emphasis on retribution and general deterrence comes from Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976), one of the Supreme Court decisions that reinvigorated the death penalty after Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972) (per curiam), had cast its constitutionality in doubt. As Stevens noted in Atkins, Gregg "identified
'retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders' as the social purposes served by the death
penalty." 536 U.S. at 313. These two purposes have been the centerpiece of the Court's Eighth Amendment analysis
in death penalty cases. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 792 (1982) ("Unless the death penalty...contributes to one or both of these goals it 'is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and
suffering,' and hence an unconstitutional punishment.").
31. 536 U.S. at 319.
32. Id. The Court also averred that people with mental retardation are more likely to confess falsely and less
able to assist counsel at trial, so that "in the aggregate [they] face a special risk of wrongful execution." Id. at 320.
I don't focus on this issue in this essay because it amounts to an attack not on executions per se but on all criminal
prosecutions of people with retardation. Nonetheless, in line with the Equal Protection analysis undertaken in this
essay, it is worth noting relevant comparisons with people suffering from mental illness. While a number of people
with retardation have apparently given false confessions, see Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences
of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological
Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 452-90 (1998) (detailing cases), people with mental illness have
also confessed to crimes they apparently did not commit. Id. at 453, 465. And clearly mental illness is a primary
reason for findings of incompetency to proceed. See GARY MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE

COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS & LAWYERS 136-37 (2d ed. 1997) (summarizing data
showing that "psychoticism" is highly correlated with incompetency).
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under sixteen. Justice Stevens began the plurality opinion in Thompson v.
Oklahoma33 by canvassing the "objective" measures of consensus on execution of
juveniles (noting, most significantly, that of the eighteen death penalty states that
had addressed the issue, none permitted execution of youth below the age of
sixteen 34). But, as he would do in Atkins when discussing people with mental
retardation, Justice Stevens also stressed the compromised culpability and
behavioral control of youth. The lesser culpability of juveniles, Justice Stevens
stated, "is too obvious to require extended explanation."3 5 He continued:
Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the teenager less able
to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at the same time he or
she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is
an adult. The reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and
responsibilities of an adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as
morally reprehensible as that of an adult.36
As to deterrability, "[tihe likelihood that the teenage offender has made the kind of
cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of execution is so
remote as to be virtually nonexistent. 37 Without the crucial fifth vote,38 the
Thompson opinion is only an indication of where the Court may draw the line for
execution of juveniles, but it is likely to place it no lower than the age of fifteen,
especially now that Atkins has banned execution of people with developmental
disabilities.39
The same types of assertions that Atkins and Thompson make about people with
retardation and juveniles can be made about people with significant mental illness.
That does not mean, of course, that the Eighth Amendment bars the latter's
execution. For despite the Court's willingness to look at more "subjective" factors,
a determination that evolving standards of decency have been abridged still requires
some evidence of statutory evolution, 40 and that evidence simply does not exist with
respect to the execution of people with mental illness. In contrast to the legislative
sentiment ranged against execution of those with mental retardation and juveniles,

33. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
34. Id. at 826. The plurality also looked at other indicia of consensus. Id. at 830-33 (canvassing positions.
of national organizations and other countries and the behavior of juries).
35. Id. at 835.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 837.
38. Justice O'Connor was the fifth vote for the result in Thompson reversing the death sentence, but her
position stemmed from her belief that the "objective" evidence left unclear whether Oklahoma's legislature intended
to impose a death sentence in such cases. Id. at 858. As to the plurality's position, she stated, "I am reluctant to
adopt [its] conclusion as a matter of constitutional law without better evidence than we now possess." Id. at 849.
39. See Victor L. Streib, Adolescence, Mental Retardation, and the DeathPenalty: The Siren Call of Atkins
v. Virginia, 33 N.M. L. Rev. 183 (2003). See alsoIn re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968 (2002). There, four Justices (Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) dissented to a denial of a writ of habeas corpus brought by a capital offender who
committed his offense at age sixteen, on the ground that the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of juveniles
under eighteen. As one explanation for doing so, Justice Stevens stated, "The reasons supporting [Atkins], with one
exception [i.e., the number of states that prohibit the practice] apply with equal or greater force to the execution of
juvenile offenders." Id.
40. Cf. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334 (concluding that "even when added to the fourteen States that have rejected
capital punishment completely, [the two state statutes that banned execution of people with mental retardation at
the time of that decision] do not provide sufficient evidence at present of a national consensus").
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only one state-Connecticut-has banned imposition of the death penalty on those
with mental illness who are competent to be executed." At the present time, no other
state is contemplating following Connecticut's lead.
On the other hand, the assertion that people with mental illness are similar to
people with mental retardation and juveniles in terms of relative culpability and
deterrability is very relevant to Equal Protection analysis.42 How strong that
similarity must be to force an equivalent ban on execution for people with mental
illness depends upon how one reads the three Court decisions that apply that
analysis to classifications based on disability. Unfortunately, those cases are not at
all clear on that score.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION AND MENTAL DISABILITY
At first glance, the Supreme Court's application of equal protection analysis to
cases involving disability all seem to say the same thing: Mental disability is neither
a suspect or a quasi-suspect classification, and the state needs only a rational basis,
not a compelling or significant one, for discriminating on that ground. But that
would be a misleading characterization of the three most pertinent decisions in this
area. In the first of these cases, the Court appeared to be applying a more rigorous
test than rational basis analysis requires. In the second, it never addressed the proper
standard of review for cases involving disability, and in any event gave reasons for
upholding the state scheme that might satisfy more heightened scrutiny. In the third,
the Court's statement that the rational basis test was the correct one for disability
cases appears to have been endorsed firmly by only three of its members, hardly a
resounding affirmance.

41. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(h) (2002) (prohibiting imposition of the death penalty when the jury or
judge finds, by special verdict, that "the defendant's mental capacity was significantly impaired or the defendant's
ability to conform the defendant's conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired but not so impaired
in either case as to constitute a defense to prosecution"). Note that even before Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399
(1986), constitutionalized the requirement, every state banned the execution of people whose mental illness rendered
them unable to understand the nature of the death penalty. Id. at 408. But that rule focuses entirely on the
individual's mental state at the time of execution, not at the time of the offense, which is the appropriate focus of
the retributive and deterrence queries addressed in Atkins and this essay.
42. Some people who have read this essay are uncomfortable with this tack. One or two have objected that
litigants should not be able to accomplish through the Equal Protection Clause what they would be denied under
the Eighth Amendment (or some other constitutional provision). But that happens all the time, when members of
burdened classes are accorded privileges not because they are'fundamentally entitled to them but because others
have them. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (recognizing an equal protection claim
against police investigative practices that do not violate the Fourth Amendment); Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)
(finding that even though there is no constitutional fight to education, an undocumented immigrant child is entitled
to education along with resident children); Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability, Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968)
(holding that a state cannot, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, prevent mothers from suing for wrongful
death of illegitimate children when it allows such suits for legitimate children, even though there is presumably no
general "right" to wrongful death actions); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,539-40 (1942) (passing on the issue
of whether criminal offenders may be sterilized but finding that laws that permit sterilization of three-time larcenists
when three-time embezzlers are not subject to sterilization violated equal protection). Others have objected that an
equal protection argument cannot be based on an inequality created by the Court's efforts to implement a
constitutional fight rather than by legislative action or inaction. But there is precedent for that result as well. In
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972), the Supreme Court held that Connecticut violated the Equal
Protection Clause by banning the sale of contraceptives to single individuals when it permitted their sale to married
couples, even though the only reason the state permitted sale of contraceptives to the latter was because it had been
required to do so by the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 475 (1965).
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The Supreme Court's first case directly addressing application of the Equal
Protection Clause to people with disability was City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne
Living Center.3 There the Cleburne Living Center sued the City of Cleburne for
denying it a permit to build and operate a group home for people with mental
retardation. The denial occurred under authority of an ordinance that required such
permits for "hospitals for the insane or feeble-minded or alcoholics or drug addicts"
and for "penal institutions" but did not require permits for other multi-person units
such as medical hospitals, nursing homes, apartment houses, fraternities and
sororities, and private clubs.4 The Living Center's principal contention was that
these distinctions violated the Equal Protection Clause because mental retardation
was either a suspect classification like race or a quasi-suspect classification like
gender.4 5 But the Court refused to find that mental retardation was either of these.46
Usually, that would have been the end of the analysis. Under the rational basis
test, the Court has stated that a law "must be upheld against Equal Protection
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification" made by the law. 47 Further, "a legislative choice
is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation
unsupported by evidence or empirical data."4 Indeed, the "burden is on the one
attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which
might support it.' '49 Laws that do not rely on suspect classifications are accorded this
strong presumption of validity because the judiciary should not "sit as a
superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy
determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed
along suspect lines."5
In short, losing the suspect classification battle usually means losing the equal
protection war. But in Cleburne, surprisingly, the Court went on to hold that the
Living Center should prevail. The majority stated that the permit requirement
43. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). In an earlier case, Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (198 1), the Court confronted
an argument that mental illness is a suspect classification for equal protection purposes, but stated that "[w]e have
no occasion to reach this issue because we conclude that this statute does not classify directly on the basis of mental
health." Id. at 231.
44. 473 U.S. at 436-37 n.3.
45. Id. at 437.
46. Id. at 442-47. More specifically, the Court gave four reasons for holding that mental retardation is not
even a quasi-suspect classification. First, people with mental retardation-in contrast, for instance, to people of
minority ethnic background or women-have a "reduced ability to cope with and function in the everyday world,"
so discrimination is more likely to be justified. Id. at 442-43. Second, many state and federal laws redress inequities
aimed at people with retardation "in a manner that belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice and a corresponding
need for more intrusive oversight by the judiciary." Id. at 443. Third, this legislation also shows that people with
mental retardation are not politically powerless. Id. at 445. Finally, a contrary holding would open the door to
arguments by a host of other groups, among them the mentally ill, that they too are entitled to special Fourteenth
Amendment protection. Id. at 445-46.
47. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). Beach Communications summarized
years of precedent on this issue. See, e.g., U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 1 (1980) ("Where.. .there are
plausible reasons for Congress's action, our inquiry is atan end."); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) ("The
Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be
rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely
we may think a political branch has acted.").
48. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 315.
49. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973).
50. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam).
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violated the Equal Protection Clause because it rested on "an irrational prejudice
against the mentally retarded"'" and on "mere negative attitudes, or fear,
unsubstantiated by factors which are properly considered in a zoning proceeding."52
In context, these statements belie a rational basis analysis. The trial court had
found that the ordinance, as written and applied, was rationally related to the city's
legitimate interests in "the legal responsibility of CLC and its residents,... the safety
and fears of residents in the adjoining neighborhood," and the number of people to
be housed in the home.53 These justifications-particularly the first two--could be
said to rely on the same sort of behavioral assumptions that the Atkins Court relied
upon in banning execution of people with mental retardation. If, as the Atkins Court
stated, people with mental retardation have diminished abilities "to control impulses,
and to understand the reactions of others," one could reasonably infer that people
with mental retardation living in the community are more likely to behave
antisocially, or at least offensively, and thus pose an increased risk of civil and
criminal liability. Rational basis review does not require empirical research to back
up this kind of inference, but in fact people with mental retardation are at least
slightly more likely to engage in violent behavior than members of the general
population (albeit probably not as likely to do so as people who abuse substances
and those who are housed in penal institutions, the other two groups subjected to the
permit process in Cleburne).'4
These observations suggest that, even if the permit denial was based on prejudice,
it was not irrational prejudice, as "irrational" is usually defined in equal protection
analysis. The denial may have been based on fear of people with mental retardation.
But there was a "rational" basis for that fear, and danger is a factor that "may
properly be considered in a zoning proceeding. 5 5 As others have asserted, the Court
in Cleburne appeared to be judging the City's action more rigorously than it
normally does in rational basis cases; it was applying, at the least, a test that some
have called "rational basis with bite. 56
The second case in which the Court confronted an equal protection challenge to
treatment of people with disabilities was Heller v. Doe. There the comparison was
not between mentally disabled people and others but rather involved the same sort

51. 473 U.S. at 450.
52. Id. at 448.
53. Id. at 437.
54. James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded CriminalDefendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
414, 426 (1985) ("The best modem evidence suggests that the incidence of criminal behavior among people with
mental retardation does not greatly exceed the incidence of criminal behavior among the population as a whole.");
Craig Smith et al., PrisonAdjustment of Youthful Inmates with Mental Retardation,28 MENTAL RETARDATION 177,
179 (June 1990) (finding that a group of offenders with mental retardation had twice as many disciplinary reports
involving assault than a matched group without retardation).
55. See, e.g., 3A KENTUCKY PRACTICE: METHODS OF PRACTICE § 25.5 (3d ed. 1990) ("land use and zoning
regulations may be employed to... prevent.. danger and congestion in the circulation of people....").
56. See, e.g., Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basis with Bite: IntermediateScrutiny by Any Other Name, 62
IND. L.J. 779, 793-99 (1987) (noting that the Cleburne Court's placement of the burden on the city to explain the
law and its detailed analysis of the city's reasons was inconsistent with traditional rational basis review); WILLIAM
B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 1161-62 (8thed. 1996). See also473

U.S. at 458 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("however labeled, the rational basis test invoked today is most assuredly not
the rational-basis test [applied in earlier cases]").
57. 509 U.S. 312 (1993).
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of comparison made in this essay, between people with mental retardation and
people with mental illness. Under Kentucky law, the standard of proof for
commitment of the first group is clear and convincing evidence, while for the second
group the standard is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 58 A second difference
between the two commitment schemes is that, in proceedings for people with
retardation, close relatives and guardians may participate as parties-with the ability
to hire lawyers, cross-examine witnesses, and appeal-whereas in commitment
proceedings for people with mental illness the respondent is confronted only by the
state.59 The claim in Heller was that both of these differences disadvantaged people
with retardation by making it easier to commit them to an institution.
As in Cleburne, the Court purported to apply rational basis review in Heller. But
the way it did so was curious. Given the disability of their clients, advocates for Doe
argued for a heightened standard of review.60 In dismissing that argument, one
would think the Court would simply have cited the eight-year-old decision in
Cleburne, which supposedly established that rational basis review was the proper
standard in such cases. Instead, the Court noted that the argument for a heightened
review standard had not been presented in the lower courts 6' and that applying such
a standard for the first time at the Supreme Court level would disadvantage the state,
which had not presented extensive evidence justifying its statutory scheme on the
assumption that rational basis review was all that was required in such cases.62
Reference to Cleburne was nowhere to be found in this discussion, suggesting at
least some ambivalence about whether the Court meant what it said in that case
about disability not being a suspect classification.
Furthermore, in upholding both challenged aspects of Kentucky's commitment
scheme, the Court gave reasons that could conceivably meet even a heightened
scrutiny standard, at least at the rational-basis-with-bite level. Assuming that mental
retardation is easier to diagnose than mental illness, 63 the Court noted that a state
might want to protect against the greater risk of error thereby associated with
commitment of the latter group through imposition of the heavier, reasonable doubt
burden on the state.64 In other words, the Kentucky scheme could easily be
characterized as an attempt to protect people with mental illness, not the result of
bias against people with mental retardation, a position that is bolstered by the fact
that the clear and convincing standard Kentucky applied to the latter group is clearly
constitutionally adequate. 65 Relatively good reasons also can be given for granting

58. Id. at 317-18.
59. Id. at 317.
60. Id. at 318-19.
61. Id. at 319.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 321. See infra text accompanying notes 95-106 (exploring further the accuracy of this assumption).
64. Id. at 322 ("If diagnosis is more difficult in cases of mental illness than in instances of mental retardation,
a higher burden of proof for the former tends to equalize the risks of an erroneous determination that the subject
of a commitment proceeding has the condition in question.").
65. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1978). The Court also asserted that commitment visits more serious
consequences on people with mental illness, in the guise of powerful anti-psychotic medication. Heller, 509 U.S.
at 324-25. The dissent argued to the contrary, noting that many people with retardation receive medication and that
they often spend their whole life in an institution, while people with mental illness are often released within a short
period of time. Id. at 342-43 (Souter, J., dissenting). While the dissent's contentions are worth considering, it
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party status to relatives and guardians of people with mental retardation. As the
Court pointed out,66 given the stable nature of retardation and its very early onset,
relatives and guardians of people with that condition are likely to have more
probative insights about behavioral and dispositional issues than relatives and
guardians of people with mental illness, a condition that often strikes for the first
time in early adulthood or later and is more changeable.67
The final Supreme Court decision addressing the equal protection implications
of laws that classify based on mental disability is Board of Trustees of the University
ofAlabama v. Garrett.6" There, several states argued, inter alia, that the provisions
in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) that require state employers to make
"reasonable accommodations" for employees with mental disability are an
unconstitutional exercise of Congress's authority, under Section V of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to enforce the equal protection guarantee.69 In agreeing with that
proposition, the Court once again concluded that the appropriate standard of review
in disability cases was the rational basis test, and this time it relied heavily on
Cleburne in doing so. 70 On authority of that case, a five-member majority flatly
stated that "states are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special
accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions toward such individuals
are rational."'" This language sounds as if the Court has unequivocally settled that
disability classifications are governed by traditional rational basis review.
But it hasn't. First, the Court had no occasion to explicate what it meant by
"rational," since it did not address any particular factual situation in Garrett;
perhaps, as it did in Cleburne, application of rational basis review to people with
mental disability will morph into "rational basis with bite." More importantly, two
members of the majority wrote a concurring opinion that did not even mention
Cleburne. Rather, after noting that "[tihere can be little doubt.. .that persons with
mental.. .impairments are confronted .with prejudice which can stem from

remains a fact that the "treatment" of people with mental illness is more likely to involve use of invasive
medications. Id. at 324-35. Further, under constitutionally correct procedures, prolonged detention must be
periodically reviewed, see Fasulo v. Arafeh, 378 A.2d 553 (Conn. 1977); Matter of Harhut, 385 N.W.2d 305 (Minn.
1986), so that the consequence of any given commitment are not exceedingly different for the two groups.
66. Heller, 509 U.S. at 329.
67. Of course, as the dissent in Heller noted, if the primary goal is to assure that relatives and guardians give
testimony, the state could simply subpoena them. Id. at 347 (Souter, J., dissenting). Testimony may not be the only
goal, however. Relatives who have spent years caring for people with retardation may have very strong preferences
for a particular disposition (e.g., community versus institution) that is most likely to be implemented through giving
them party status. The question in most cases involving people with retardation is not whether commitment will take
place but where it will occur. See Leonard E. Heller, Sec'y, Ky. Cabinet for Human Res., Petitioner v. Samuel Doe,
by His Mother and Next Friend, Mary Doe, et al., Respondents, No. 92-351, October Term, 1992, Feb. 23, 1993,
Reply Brief for Petitioner. The dissent's assumption that family members who are given party status are more likely
to act as a "second prosecutor," Heller, 509 U.S. at 348 (Souter, J., dissenting), is generally not true in this context.
68. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
69. Id. at 360. The states' specific contention in Garrett,with which the Court agreed, was that suits for
money damages under the ADA are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. The Eleventh Amendment prevents
suits against nonconsenting states unless Congress has abrogated state immunity "pursuant to a valid grant of
constitutional authority," see Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000), and the GarrettCourt found
that there was no such authority for suits alleging discrimination based on disability under its cases (including
Cleburne), 531 U.S. at 367.
70. Garrett,531 U.S. at 366-67.
71. Id.at367.
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indifference or insecurity as well as from malicious ill will,

'7 2

Justices Kennedy and

O'Connor emphasized the absence of proof that any state had engaged in "a pattern
73
or practice" that was "designed" to discriminate against people with disability.
When the views of these two justices are combined with the views of the fourmember dissent, which expressed a more expansive view of Cleburne than the
majority, 74 the equal protection status of mental disability remains in some doubt,
at least where the state intentionally discriminates based on that classification.
Under such circumstances, there is even precedent for an explicit move to
heightened scrutiny. Referring to the Court's gender cases, Professor Weber points
out that "[h]istory suggests that an erratic pattern of decisions, combined with
protests by the Court that it is applying a rational-basis test, may lead to an eventual
use of intermediate scrutiny."75 At least as significant, the Court's caselaw indicates
that when the state's differential treatment affects life or liberty, as it obviously does
in the death penalty context, heightened scrutiny is more likely.76 In short, a strong
case can be made that states that continue to execute people with mental illness now
that Atkins has been decided need to demonstrate not just a plausible reason, but a
good reason, for doing so.
III. WHY EXECUTION OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Combining the conclusions of the previous two sections, execution of people with
mental illness should not be permitted unless there is good reason to believe that
people with mental illness are more culpable or deterrable than people with mental
retardation or juveniles. That demonstration might be possible with respect to many
forms of "mental illness." But it cannot be made when mental illness is equated with
psychosis at the time of the crime.
The classic psychotic diagnosis is schizophrenia. As defined in the American
Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM),77 people who
suffer from schizophrenia experience "a range of cognitive and emotional dysfunctions that include perception, inferential thinking, language and communication,
behavioral monitoring, affect, fluency and productivity of thought and speech,

72. Id. at 375 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 381-82 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the ADA's prohibition of discrimination based on
mental disability implements the Court's holding in Cleburne).
75. Mark C. Weber, Disability Harassment in the Public Schools, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1079, 1128

(2002).
76. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992). A four-member plurality found that the Equal
Protection Clause was violated by continued confinement, on dangerousness grounds, of an insanity acquittee who
was no longer mentally ill when other persons who committed criminal acts could not be confined on those grounds.
Id. at 84-86. As Justice White stated for the plurality, "[fQreedom from physical restraint being a fundamental right,
the State must have a particularly convincing reason... for [confinement of] insanity acquittees who are no longer
mentally ill." Id. Justice O'Connor wrote a separate opinion in Foucha stating, "Although I think it unnecessary to
reach equal protection issues on the facts before us, the permissibility of holding an acquittee who is not mentally
ill longer than a person convicted of the same crimes could be imprisoned is open to serious question." Id. at 88
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
77. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS

(4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM].
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hedonic capacity, volition and drive, and attention. 78 The specific symptoms
include delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech, and grossly disorganized
behavior.79 Put even more functionally, people with schizophrenia have difficulty
focusing on essential information, are easily distracted by irrelevant stimuli, often
experience "thought blocking" (involving a complete halt to thinking), attribute
elaborate meaning to what they see and hear, engage in combinative thinking
(involving the reduction of impressions into unrealistic beliefs), and have difficulty
forming abstract concepts correctly.8"
Recall that Atkins considered people with mental retardation ineligible for the
death penalty because of their "diminished capacities to understand and process
information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience,
to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions
of others."'" The Thompson plurality reached the same conclusion with respect to
juveniles because juveniles are less able than adults "to evaluate the consequences
of their actions" and because "[tihe likelihood that the teenage offender has made
the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of
execution is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent." 2 The brief description of
schizophrenic symptoms above makes clear that people who suffer from psychosis
also have great difficulty in communicating with and understanding others, engaging
in logical cost-benefit analysis, and evaluating the consequences of and controlling
their behavior. As noted in my earlier article, "[i]f anything, the delusions, command
hallucinations, and disoriented thought process of those who are mentally ill
represent greater dysfunction than that experienced by most 'mildly' retarded
individuals (the only retarded people likely to commit crime) and by virtually any
non-mentally ill teenager."83
Of course, psychotic symptoms can have mitigating impact during the criminal
process. The various insanity tests,84 the diminished capacity and diminished
responsibility defenses,85 and capital sentencing law itselt 6 recognize that these
symptoms may significantly affect the ability to understand the nature of one's
actions, to differentiate between right and wrong, to formulate intent, and to control

78. Id. at 274.
79. Id. at 285.
80. ROBERT SCHOPP, AUTOMATISM, INSANITY, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY: A
PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 185-87 (1991) (describing these and other symptoms).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.

82. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
83. Slobogin, supra note I, at 669.
84. Generally, these tests recognize an excuse for people who, as a result of mental disease, have substantial
difficulty differentiating right from wrong or controlling their behavior. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 32, at 19093 (describing the tests).
85. The phrase "diminished capacity defense" refers to the claim that the defendant did not have the requisite
mens rea due to the effects of mental disease or defect. A successful diminished responsibility defense leads to the
reduction of charge, usually in murder cases, based on the volition-impairing effects of mental disorder. Both are
distinct from the insanity defense. See generally id. at 204-08 (describing and distinguishing these defenses).
86. Every death penalty state stipulates that mental illness at the time of the offense is to be considered as
a possible mitigating circumstance. Ellen Fels Berkman, Mental Illness as an Aggravating Circumstance in Capital
Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 291, 296-98 (1989). The most common method of framing that concept is through
recognition of "extreme mental or emotional stress" as a mitigating factor. Id.
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behavior. Thus, one might assume, a ban on execution of people with significant
mental illness at the time of the offense is likely to have no practical impact.
That assumption would be wrong. Just as people with retardation and juveniles
have ended up on death row despite mitigating characteristics, many people who
experienced psychotic symptoms at the time of their crime are sentenced to death.
The insanity defense is rarely successful, even (or especially) in murder cases.8 7 In
most jurisdictions, other defenses that in theory could give mitigating impact to
mental illness are either not recognized or are very narrowly defined. 8 And while
extreme mental or emotional distress and other abnormal mental conditions are
usually explicitly recognized as mitigating factors in capital sentencing statutes,89
research suggests that presentation of such evidence often acts as an aggravating
factor.9" Apparently, sentencing juries and judges focus more on the perceived
dangerousness of such individuals than on their diminished culpability and
deterrability. 9 1 Whatever the reason, the available evidence suggests that a sizeable
number of people with psychotic symptomatology are on death row.92 Reported
cases also indicate that, as was the case with offenders suffering from mental
retardation before Atkins, many courts are unwilling to reverse death sentences
simply because of credible evidence of significant mental illness at the time of the
crime.9 3

87. MELTON ET AL., supra note 32, at 188 (surveying studies that roughly suggest a twenty-five percent
success rate with insanity claims that go to trial); Henry J. Steadman et al., FactorsAssociated with a Successfid
Insanity Plea, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 401, 402-03 (1983) (insanity defense no more successful in murder cases
than in cases involving other crimes).

88. RALPH REISNER, CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN & ARTI RAI, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 563-64 (3d ed. 1999) (noting that only half the states recognize the diminished capacity
defense and no state has adopted a diminished responsibility defense based explicitly on mental abnormality);
WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAw 711 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that in many states a provocation defense based on
"special mental qualities" is not recognized). Even if recognized, a diminished capacity defense is seldom plausible
because most people with mental illness who commit a crime intend to commit it. See State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d
359, 374 (Utah 1995) ("As to crimes requiring intent, an insane person will virtually always have the mental state
required by the law.. .even though the defendant suffers from severe mental derangement, such as an extreme and
bizarre psychotic delusion.").
89. See supra note 86.
90. The evidence for this point is assembled at Slobogin, supra note 1, at 669-70. In general, the research
shows that one of the best predictors of a death sentence is assertion of an insanity defense at trial, and that
presentation of evidence supporting a claim of extreme mental or emotional stress is much more likely to correlate
with a death sentence than a life sentence. Id.
91. Id. at 670. As argued in my earlier article, this fact, in itself, could be grounds for a separate, due process
challenge to execution of people with mental illness. Because every state makes mental disability a mitigating
factor, the apparent tendency of capital sentencing bodies to use mental disability as an aggravator evidences a
failure to follow state statutory provisions, which is a due process violation. Id. Another reason people with mental
illness may be sentenced to death is because they do not "look" ill to jurors. See Michael L. Perlin, "Life is in
Mirrors,Death Disappears":Giving Life to Atkins, 33 N.M. L. REV. 315 (2003).
92. Mark D. Cunningham & Mark P. Vigen, Death Row Inmate Characteristics,Adjustment, and
Confinement: A CriticalReview of the Literature, 20 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 191, 193, 200 (2002) (noting that incidence
of schizophrenia on death row is at least five percent and perhaps higher); Dorothy 0. Lewis et al., Psychiatric,
Neurological, and Psychoeducational Characteristics of 15 Death Row Inmates in the United States, 143 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 838, 840 (1986) (finding that forty percent of fifteen adult death row inmates were chronically
psychotic, evidencing, e.g., loose, illogical thought processes, delusions, and hallucinations).
93. See, e.g., Illinois v. Haynes, 737 N.E.2d 169, 193-96 (1I1.2000) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting) (noting five
of six experts found defendant to be delusional at time of trial and well before it);Walton v. Angelone, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5240,20-24,45-49,62-63, 76 (W.D. Va. 2002) (upholding death sentence despite very strong evidence
of schizophrenia at time of offense and at trial); Feguer v. United States, 302 F.2d 214, 228-36 (8th Cir. 1962) (same
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These facts have diametrically opposed implications for the two constitutional
doctrines most relevant to the proper scope of the death penalty. They undercut an
Eighth Amendment claim because, if they show any consensus, it is that significant
mental illness at the time of the crime should not be a bar to execution. But they
bolster the equal protection argument, because they show an "irrational prejudice"
against people with mental illness that is not justified by any legitimate state goal.
To state the strongest possible equal protection case against execution of people
with mental illness, the following discussion will be framed in terms of traditional
rationality review. Under that standard, it will be recalled, a state practice "must be
upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable
state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification."'94 There are
three conceivable bases for supporting continued execution of people with mental
illness after Atkins, to wit: compared to mental retardation and youth, mental illness
is (1) harder to diagnose, (2) less characteriological and more avoidable, and (3)
more likely to lead to violent behavior. Good arguments can be made that all three
of these distinctions are specious (and are therefore unreasonable), and they
certainly do not withstand the more heightened scrutiny represented by Cleburne.
A. Definition and Proof
Taking a cue from Heller,95 advocates for continued execution of people with
mental illness in the wake of Atkins and Thompson might contend that mental illness
is harder to define than "youth" or mental retardation. Mental retardation is
measured primarily through objective tests that produce quantified results.96 Age is
even more easily verifiable. Diagnosing mental illness, on the other hand, is a more
seat-of-the pants assessment known to be difficult to carry out reliably.97 It could be

outcome); People v. Rittger, 355 P.2d 645 (Cal. 1960) (same outcome); People v. Crews, 522 N.E.2d 1167 (I1.
1988) (upholding death sentence for defendant found guilty but mentally ill, with mental illness defined as "a
substantial disorder of thought, mood, or behavior which afflicted a person at the time of the commission of the
1992) (same outcome);
offense and which impaired that person's judgment"); Illinois v. Scott, 594 N.E.2d 217 (Ill.
State v. Wilson, 413 S.E.2d 19 (S.C. 1992) (same outcome); Colbum v. Texas, 966 S.W.2d 511, 512 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1998) (rejecting argument that an "extensive history of paranoid schizophrenia" prevents the imposition of
the death penalty); Hernandez v. Johnson, 248 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding death sentence despite admission
from prosecution witness that schizophrenia was "primary" diagnosis and jury instructions that did not call attention
to mental illness as a mitigating factor but rather merely told jury to consider all the evidence and determine whether
defendant "deliberately" killed and was dangerous); State v. Berry, 686 N.E.2d 1097, 1103-04 (Ohio 1997)
(upholding death sentence of offender who was diagnosed with schizophrenia and psychosis prior to the offense
and "confessed" on condition the state would execute him); Corcoran v. Indiana, 2002 Ind. LEXIS 688 (2002)
(upholding death sentence over a dissent that cited Atkins in concluding that "because Corcoran is obviously
severely mentally ill, he should be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, not death"). See generally
Phyllis L. Crocker, Concepts of Culpability and Deathworthiness:Differentiating Between Guilt and Punishment
in Death Penalty Cases, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 21, 27, 66-78, nn.218, 231 (1997) (stating that "courts frequently
employ the guilt-phase insanity test as the standard by which to judge a defendant's punishment-phase mitigating
evidence of mental illness" and citing and describing cases).
94. See supra text accompanying note 47 (emphasis added).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
96. See DSM, supra note 77, at 39 (noting that mental retardation is measured in part through an assessment
of "general intellectual functioning," which is defined by the intelligence quotient, which in turn is obtained by use
of "one or more of the standardized, individually administered intelligence tests"). But see infra text accompanying
notes 103-106.
97. Field studies of inter-rater reliability on specific diagnoses of serious mental illness indicate a relatively
low rate of agreement. See, e.g., Paul Lieberman & Frances Baker, The Reliability of PsychiatricDiagnosisin the
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argued, consequently, that the state would not be able to implement a ban on
execution of people with mental illness in a sensible manner. Furthermore, the
amorphous nature of mental illness makes malingering easier. In combination, these
difficulties could be said to undermine the state's ability to achieve both the
retributive and the deterrence goals of the death penalty. Mistakes would be made
as to who is culpable or deterrable enough to warrant execution, and would-be
offenders might calculate that, if caught, they can successfully feign illness and at
least escape the death penalty.
There is no doubt that mental illness is an exceedingly vague term. Even when
one confines mental illness to psychosis, as I have done in this article, the diagnostic
nomenclature is slippery. For instance, with respect to delusions, a principal
symptom of schizophrenia, the DSM admits that "[t]he distinction between a
delusion and a strongly held idea is sometimes difficult to make and depends on the
degree of conviction with which the belief is held despite clear contradictory
evidence."98 Similarly, assessment of the "bizarreness" of delusions, also important
to a diagnosis of schizophrenia, "may be difficult to judge, especially across
different cultures." 99
All of this seriously undermines the equal protection argument against execution
of people with mental illness if the comparison group is juveniles. Age is hard to get
wrong. Thus, there is an obvious distinction between youth and mental illness in
terms of ease of "diagnosis."
But none of the foregoing supplies a good reason for differentiating between
people with significant mental illness and those with mental retardation. Heller,
which assumed that mental illness is more difficult to discern than mental
retardation, may appear to hold otherwise, but it does not. The type of mental
disorder that can provide the basis for civil commitment, which was the legal
context at issue in that case, is much broader than the psychoses at issue here.' 0
When focused solely on gross impairment related to psychosis, studies show a much
higher rate of reliability (i.e., agreement between diagnosticians) despite the softness
of the criteria, 0'' and other research indicates that successful malingering is very
Emergency Room, 36 HOSP. & COMM. PSYCHIATRY 291 (1985) (finding forty-one percent agreement on
schizophrenia, fifty percent agreement on mood disorders; thirty-seven percent agreement on organic disorders).
98. Id. at 275.
99. Id.
100. The typical civil commitment statute defines mental disorder in language that often sounds like
psychosis. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-3(N) (2002) (defining mental disorder as "the substantial disorder of
the person's emotional processes, thought or cognition which grossly impairs judgment, behavior or capacity to
recognize reality"). However, people with non-psychotic personality disorders and depression are routinely
committed under these statutes. Mary L. Durham, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Research, Policy and
Practice,in MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: RESEARCH, POLICY & SERVICES 17, 19 (Bruce Sales & Saleem Shah, eds.,
1996). See also Matter of D.C., 679 A.2d 634 (N.J. 1996) (upholding constitutionality of amended New Jersey
commitment statute clarifying that "mental illness" does not require that a person be psychotic).
101. The low ratios for inter-rater reliability cited earlier, see supra note 97, came from emergency room
settings, which are quite different from the considered evaluation process that would occur in death penalty contexts.
Research on the diagnosis of schizophrenia in more sedate environs has found agreement rates above eighty percent.
See REISNER, SLOBOGIN & RAI, supra note 88, at 418. See also Kenneth K. Fukunaga et al., Insanity Plea: InterExaminerAgreement and Concordanceof PsychiatricOpinion and Court Verdict, 5 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 325
(1981) (finding ninety-two percent inter-rater agreement on gross impairment); Michael R. Phillips et al., Psychiatry
and the Criminal Justice System: Testing the Myths, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 605 (1988) (finding seventy-six
percent agreement on psychosis).
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difficult. 112 More importantly, contrary to common belief, diagnosis of mental
retardation does not consist simply of adding up scores on an intelligence test to see
if the person has an IQ above or below seventy (the widely accepted presumptive
cut-off score"°3). Putting aside questions about the reliability of such tests," °4 the
DSM notes that "it is possible to diagnose Mental Retardation in individuals with
IQs of seventy and seventy-five who exhibit significant deficits in adaptive
behavior. Conversely, Mental Retardation would not be diagnosed in an individual
with an IQ lower than seventy if there are no significant deficits or impairments in
adaptive functioning."'' 0 5 As suggested by some of the other articles in this
symposium,10' "adaptive functioning" is at least as amorphous a term as "delusion,"
"hallucination," or "disorganized speech."
Let us assume, however, that the nuances just discussed do not dissuade courts
from adopting the holding in Heller that there is a rational basis for believing
psychosis is harder to diagnose than mental retardation. The proper response to that
concern, as Heller itself acknowledged, is to require more convincing proof that the
person suffers from significant mental illness."0 7 Just as the diagnostic challenge
does not prevent the state from committing people with mental illness if they are
dangerous to self or others, it should not permit the state to execute them when they
are no more culpable or deterrable than children or people with retardation.
A related objection to equating the two groups, also suggested by Heller,"'8 is
based on the notion that mental illness is a highly variable condition, whereas mental
retardation is a permanent status, with relatively constant symptomatology
throughout life. As a consequence, the contention might be that a diagnosis of
102. See MICHAEL PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 238-41 (1994). Perlin states that
"there is virtually no evidence that feigned insanity has ever been a remotely significant problem of criminal
procedure," id. at 238, that advances in detection of malingering can discern faking in over ninety percent of the
cases in which it does occur, id. at 240, and that seriously mentally disabled criminal defendants will often feign
sanity in an effort to avoid stigmatization as mentally ill, even where such evidence might serve as powerful
mitigating evidence in death penalty cases. Id. at 240-41 (noting that "juveniles imprisoned on death row were quick
to tell Dr. Dorothy Lewis and her associates, 'I'm not crazy,' or 'I'm not a retard."').
103. DSM, supra note 77, at 39.
104. See id. at 73-74 (discussing how tests may be biased against minorities or by examiner behavior); David
L. Rumley, A License to Kill: The CategoricalExemption of the Mentally Retardedfrom the Death Penalty, 24 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 1299, 1329-40 (1993) (discussing the unreliability of IQ tests and stating that, as a result, "the obtained
score is only one of a number of possible scores that may be achieved with different sample questions or with the
same questions at different times"); Jonathan L. Bing, Protectingthe Mentally Retardedfrom CapitalPunishment:
State Efforts Since Penry and Recommendations for the Future, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 59, 67-70
(1996) (discussing debates about whether the cut-off score should be seventy or as high as eighty-five).
105. DSM, supra note 77, at 39-40.
106. See Douglas Mossman, Atkins v. Virginia: A PsychiatricCan of Worms, 33 N.M. L. REV. 255 (2003);
Jeffrey Fagan, Atkins, Culpability and the Jurisprudenceof Adolescent Punishment, 33 N.M L. REV. 207 (2003).
See also Bing, supra note 104, at 70 (discussing the various definitions of "adaptive functioning").
107. For instance, Oklahoma's newly promulgated rules for implementing Atkins provide that the defendant
bears the burden of showing mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence. See Murphy v. State, Okla.No.
PCD-2-2-1197 (2002); 71 CRIM. L. REP. 658 (2002). If a legislature or court is concerned that mental illness is more
difficult to discern accurately, the defendant can be required to show its existence by clear and convincing evidence
or proof beyond a reasonable doubt. There are many examples of cases where such proof is not forthcoming, despite
some evidence of mental illness. See, e.g., Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526 (11 th Cir. 2000) (finding that careful
assessment of offender's psychiatric history and behavior around time of the offense revealed no symptoms of
schizophrenia at or near that time despite defense expert's conclusory testimony that he was psychotic when the
crime was committed).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
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retardation provides probative evidence on mental state at the time of the offense
regardless of when it is made (i.e., well before the offense, at the time of trial, or at
any time in between), whereas a diagnosis of psychosis is only relevant to the
sentencing question if it pertains to the time of the offense. This contention
attributes an impermanency to psychosis that is all too rare. As the DSM states,
"[s]chizophrenia tends to be chronic,"'" and "[c]omplete remission (i.e., a return to
full premorbid functioning) is probably not common.' 10 In any event, the proper
response to any concerns about variability is, once again, to place a heavier burden
on defendants alleging mental illness to show that they suffered from psychotic
symptoms during the relevant time period, rather than simply assume they are more
deserving of the death penalty than people with mental retardation."'
Given the alternative of raising the standard of proof, the difficulty-of-diagnosis
rationale for continuing to allow execution of people with mental illness after Atkins
clearly does not satisfy heightened scrutiny, which requires that the government's
solution be narrowly tailored to the problem. 2 Indeed, the rationale does not even
satisfy rational basis review's requirement that the government's aims and the way
it chooses to implement them be reasonably related. The state is not acting
reasonably if it justifies execution of people with mitigating mental illness simply
on the ground that it has difficulty identifying who they are.
B. Accountabilityfor Status
The second possible objection to equating mental illness, mental retardation, and
youth for purposes of administering the death penalty more directly compares the
impact of those conditions on culpability and deterrability. Building on the relative
variability notion previously discussed, the contention would be something like this:
Even if we have sufficient proof of psychosis at the time of the offense, that
condition is not as mitigating as mental retardation or youth because the mentally
ill person is more "responsible" for the situation in two ways. First, adults with
mental illness, while impaired, are not developmentally impaired; thus, they have
greater capacity and more opportunity than juveniles or people with retardation to
develop an understanding of the rules of society and human interaction. Second,
mental illness, in particular psychosis, is more easily treatable than either retardation
or youth, making the person with mental illness at the time of the offense more at
13
"fault" for the impairment and its consequences.'

109. DSM, supra note 77, at 282.
110. Id.

111. Cf. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 ("As with our approach in Fordv. Wainwright, with regard to insanity, 'we
leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon its
execution of sentences."').
112. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 518-19 (2002) (1997)

(noting that rational basis analysis will strike down a law only if it is "not a reasonable way to attain the end"
whereas intermediate scrutiny strikes down a law unless the means chosen is "narrowly tailored to achieve the
goal").
113. Cf. David Wexler, Inducing Therapeutic Compliance Through the Criminal Law, 14 L. & PSYCHOL.

REV. 43 (1990) (suggesting that mentally ill persons who fail to take medication knowing the possible consequences
are guilty of the crime of "reckless endangerment").
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These maturity and treatment differences do exist. But they do not provide good
grounds for making distinctions in punishment. With respect to the first difference,
it is true that, on average, mentally ill adults are more advanced developmentally
than either people with mental retardation or juveniles, because the onset of
psychosis usually does not occur until the late teens or early twenties." 4 But, as
noted above, once psychosis takes hold, it seldom disappears. More importantly, the
cognitive and volitional impairment associated with active schizophrenia is likely
to be much more severe than that which occurs with mental retardation or
immaturity. Consider again the symptoms of psychosis, using the language of the
DSM. Delusions involve "misinterpretations of perceptions and experiences."" 5
They are usually "clearly implausible and not understandable and do not derive from
ordinary life experiences.""' 6 Hallucinations are usually auditory and often consist
of "pejorative or threatening voices."" 7 The speech of people with schizophrenia is
"tangential" and full of "loose associations," indicating a high degree of disorganized thought. 1 8 Their behavior ranges from "childlike silliness to unpredictable
agitation," is rarely "goal-directed," and leads "to difficulties in performing activities of daily living.""' As these descriptions indicate, once psychotic symptoms set
knowledge and learning gained from earlier experiences has
in, any "real-world"
20
little influence. 1
Nor should differences in treatability affect retributive or utilitarian analysis.
Anti-psychotic medication has vastly improved the treatment of the psychoses, and
in many people it can eliminate or substantially reduce the most conspicuous
psychotic symptoms in a short period of time.' 2' In contrast, habilitation of people
with retardation and counseling of wayward juveniles is more time-consuming and
less dramatically successful.122 But to conclude from these facts that people who are
psychotic at the time of an offense could have more easily avoided their impaired
condition and thus are more justly held accountable is too great a leap; in the usual
case, a failure to obtain treatment for psychosis cannot seriously be characterized
either as "blameworthy" or as behavior that imposition of the death penalty would

114. DSM, supra note 77, at 282.
115. Id. at 275.
116. Id.
117. Id.

at 276.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 1have argued that people with mental illness usually retain some sense of right and wrong, and thus
should not be found insane when they intentionally commit crime unless their motivating delusions, if assumed to
be true, would sound in justification or duress. Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of
Mental Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199 (2000). In the death penalty context, however, the issue
is not whether culpability is so diminished that the person should be acquitted, but rather whether it is diminished
sufficiently to make the ultimate punishment unwarranted.
121. See generally Herbert Y. Meltzer & S. Hossein Fatemi, Treatment of Schizophrenia, in ESSENTIALS OF
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 399, 406 (Alan F. Schatzberg & Charles B. Nemeroff eds., 2001) ("Conventional

neuroleptics and the atypical antipsychotics are effective in treating an acute exacerbation of schizophrenia... and
effect remission of psychosis in about 75% of patients within days to months.... Most patients show a near maximal
response by 6 weeks of treatment.").
122. TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 710-11 (John A. Talbott et al. eds., 1988) (discussing the need for "longterm" programs for those with mental retardation); ScoTr W. HENGGELER ET AL., MULTISYSTEMIC TREATMENT OF
ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 3-20 (1998) (describing state of the art treatment designed

to reduce recidivism in youth that takes approximately four months).
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somehow change. First, many people with psychosis are not capable of recognizing
the benefits of medication or the risks of not taking it.123 Second, those who do have
such capability may nonetheless resist medication because they know it can have
2
serious side effects, requires long-term maintenance, and is unevenly successful. 1
Finally, even those who might want medication can have good reasons for not being
on it. As one study indicated, most people with mental disorders do not seek
treatment because they "do not realize that effective treatments exist,...fear
discrimination because of the stigma attached to mental illness[, ' or5 are unable to]
afford treatment because they lack insurance that would cover it.'
In any event, if there are some cases in which people with mental illness could
be said to be "on notice" that a failure to seek or maintain treatment might result in
a serious crime, there are certainly similar cases involving people with mental
retardation and youth. Many people with mental retardation know they have a
disorder but deny it rather than seek help.126 Juveniles who commit violent crimes
have generally been given several opportunities to obtain treatment through previous
involvement in the juvenile justice system. 127 There can be no rational distinction
between these groups, or at least no distinction that passes a rational-basis-with-bite
test, on the ground that people with mental illness are somehow more accountable
for their condition.
C. Dangerousness
In both Atkins and Thompson, the Court's "independent evaluation" of whether
imposition of the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment focused on the two
purposes of punishment already mentioned, retribution and deterrence. 128 As Justice
Scalia pointed out in Atkins, there is at least one other purpose of punishment that
the imposition of the death penalty might seek to accomplish: (permanent)
incapacitation. 129 And, as indicated earlier, research suggests that it is the perceived
123. A principal symptom of psychosis is "lack of insight" into the nature of one's mental condition. DSM,.
supra note 77, at 279 ("Lack of insight is common and may be one of the best predictors of poor outcome, perhaps
because it predisposes the individual to noncompliance with treatment.").
124. See Meltzer & Fatemi, supra note 121, at 413-21 (describing complications of psychotropic drugs,
including hypertension, muscle spasms, Parkinsonism, seizures, and tardive dyskinesia); Patricia L. Gilbert et al.,
Neuroleptic Withdrawal in Schizophrenia Patients: A Review of the Literature, 52 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 173,

182 (1995) ("approximately half of all the patients withdrawn from neuroleptic therapy remained stable without
relapse over average follow-up periods of 6.3 to 9.7 months, while, despite neuroleptic maintenance, 15.6 percent
patients [sic] relapsed over an average follow-up period of 7.9 months"); Ebrahim M. Gul, Patient Response to
Clozapine in a Forensic Psychiatric Hospital, 45 HosP. & COMM. PSYCHIATRY 271 (1994) (finding that thirty
percent of forensic patients did not have a "clinically effective response" from administration of clozapine, a new,
highly touted anti-psychotic medication).
125. Robert Pear, Few Seek to Treat Mental DisordersCommon, U.S. Says; Many Not Treated, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 13, 1999, at Al.
126. Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 54, at 430,439 ("Many mentally retarded individuals expend considerable
energy attempting to avoid this stigma, even though proper teaching can equip most retarded persons to tailor their
actions to social expectations.").
127.

HOWARD N. SNYDER & M. SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT

(Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse 1999) (finding that forty percent of males with a violent career and thirty-four
percent of females with an antisocial career come into contact with the justice system before age thirteen).
128. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 836.
129. 536 U.S. at 350 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court conveniently ignores a third 'social purpose' of the
death penalty-'incapacitation of dangerous criminals and the consequent prevention of crimes that they may
otherwise commit in the future."').
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dangerousness of the offender, not his or her blameworthiness and not concern about
deterrence goals, that is the most influential factor for many involved in making
death sentence determinations. 130 Thus, a final argument for continuing to execute
people with mental illness in the wake of Atkins and Thompson is that they are more
dangerous than people with retardation or juveniles.
A first response to this argument is that Justice Scalia's assertion about the
relevance of dangerousness in death penalty cases is incorrect, at least when mental
disability is at issue. Mental retardation, mental illness, and youth are all universally

recognized mitigating factors. 3' Therefore, presumably, they cannot be aggravating
factors.' Yet that is precisely what they become when one tries to justify execution

on the ground that these conditions make people more dangerous.
Even if incapacitation is a valid consideration in determining the scope of the
death penalty for people with mental disability, the claim that people with mental
illness are super dangerous is easily debunked. Admittedly, the base rate for
violence among the most severely mentally ill is more elevated than the violence
base rate for the general population.'33 But the more relevant comparison in the
death penalty context is between mentally ill and non-disordered offenders, and
research indicates that the former group is no more, and probably less, dangerous
than the latter.3 4 Most relevant to the equal protection analysis, people with mental
illness are no more likely to recidivate than offenders who suffer from mental
retardation' 35 and are clearly less likely to reoffend than juvenile offenders.'36

130. See supra text accompanying note 90. See also Aletha Claussen-Schulz et al., Attitudes, Evidence, Jury
Instructions, and Offender Dangerousness: Which Paths Point to Death? (manuscript in preparation) (finding, in
a study using mock jurors, that concerns about future violent conduct accounted for more variance in the sentencing
decision than did other aggravating circumstances); Sally Costanzo & Mark Costanzo, Life or Death Decisions: An
Analysis of Capital Jury Decision Making Under the Special Issues Sentencing Framework, 18 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
151 (1994) (finding, based on interviews of capital sentencing jurors, that jurors tended to spend most of their
deliberation time deciding whether the defendant would be violent if not executed).
131. Even before Atkins, the Supreme Court had held that mental retardation is a constitutionally mandated
mitigating factor. Penry, 492 U.S. at 328. The Court has also strongly suggested that the Constitution requires that
mental illness and youth be considered in mitigation. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) ("The Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record."). In any event, every state does
so. See supra note 86; Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982).
132. I elaborate on this argument in Slobogin, supra note 1, at 670. See also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,
885 (1983) (stating, in dictum, that it would be constitutionally impermissible to give aggravating effect to factors
such as "race, religion or political affiliation or.. .conduct that actually should militate in favor of a lesser penalty,
such as perhaps the defendant's mental illness").
133. See REISNER, SLOBOGIN & RAI, supra note 88, at 653-55 (summarizing studies).
134. James Bonta et al., The Prediction of Criminal and Violent Recidivism Among Mentally Disordered
Offenders: A Meta Analysis, 123 PSYCHOL. BULL. 123 (1998) (meta-analysis finding that the major predictors of
recidivism were the same for mentally disordered offenders as for nondisordered offenders, and that
psychopathology should be deemphasized as a predictor); Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, A Comparison of
Criminal Recidivism Among Schizophrenic and Nonschizophrenic Offenders, 15 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 397
(1992) (finding that schizophrenic subjects were less likely to commit offenses upon release than their
nonschizophrenic counterparts).
135. Compare supra note 134 (regarding data describing recidivism among offenders with mental illness)
with supra note 54 (regarding data describing recidivism among offenders with mental retardation); Health Evidence
Bulls. (Dec. 31, 1999), at http://hebw.uwcm.ac.uk/learningdisabilities/chapter6.htm (citing several studies
concerning recidivism of "intellectually disabled" offenders and concluding that "[s]tudies have found re-offending
rates of untreated offenders of between 40 and 70%... .A range of studies have found re-offending rates following
treatment to be between 20 and 55% depending on the type of treatment and the offence."); EMILY F. REED, THE
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CONCLUSION
A credible Eighth Amendment argument against the execution of people who are
mentally ill cannot be made, because only one legislature in a death penalty state has
barred such executions. But that fact simply strengthens the equal protection
argument. Because murderers with proven significant mental illness at the time of
the offense are no more culpable or deterrable, nor any more dangerous, than
juvenile murderers or murderers who suffer from mental retardation, the only
possible basis for the states' continued willingness to execute members of the first
group is the type of "irrational prejudice" against which Cleburne inveighed.
Up to this point in this essay, the evidence of such prejudice has been primarily
negative in nature, in the sense that it consists of rebutting possible "rational"
explanations for continued execution of people with mental illness. But there is
plenty of positive evidence of irrational prejudice as well. Research about attitudes
toward individuals with mental illness strongly suggests that most of us view such
people to be abnormally dangerous.' 37 Although, as indicated above, this perception
is clearly inaccurate, if held by legislators and jurors bent on ensuring public safety
through executions,"' it explains both why there is no legislative momentum toward
barring their execution and why mental illness, supposedly a mitigating factor, is so
highly correlated with death sentences.
These findings also suggest the nature of the irrational prejudice at work, which
research from the mammoth Capital Jury Sentencing Project clarifies.'39 In one
aspect of that study, 187 jurors who served on fifty-three capital cases tried in South
Carolina between 1988 and 1997 were queried about their emotional reactions to
capital offenders. 140 Regression analysis of their responses revealed that, of the eight
emotions studied (including fear, sympathy, anger, and disgust), only "fear" of the
offender correlated significantly with the final vote on sentence.' 41 The researchers
also found that the most feared type of offender was one perceived to be a

PENRY PENALTY: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 17 (1993) (describing data

showing a link between mental retardation and crime).
136. Compare SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 127, at 62 (finding that, nationally, juveniles committed
twenty-seven percent of violent victimizations in the years surveyed) and Dep't Human Services, Victoria, Aust.,
Recidivism Among VictorianJuvenile JusticeClients, 1997-2001 12 (2002), available at http://www.dhs.vic.gov.au

(Juvenile Justice) (last modified Feb. 13, 2003) (stating that recidivism rate of children ages eleven through sixteen
ranges from eighty percent to 40.8 percent) with Henry Steadman et al., Violence by PeopleDischargedfrom Acute
PsychiatricInpatientFacilitiesandby Others in the Same Neighborhoods,55 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 393 (1998)

(finding no significant differences between the prevalence of violence by patients with mental illness and by others
living in the same neighborhood).
137. See, e.g., Bernice A. Pescosolido et al., The Public's View of the Competence, Dangerousness,and Need
for Legal Coercion ofPersons with Mental Health Problems, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1339, 1341 (1999) (reporting
that while seventeen percent of a random sample of citizens felt that a "troubled person" was "very likely" or
"somewhat likely" to be violent, 33.3 percent said the same of the depressed person, and sixty percent said the same
of a person with schizophrenia); Linda Teplin, The Criminality of the Mentally Ill: A Dangerous Misconception,
142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 593, 597-98 (1985).
138. As noted earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 90 and 130, dangerousness seems to be the
predominant factor in death penalty decision making.
139. For a description of the Capital Jury Sentencing Project, see William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury
Project:Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043 (1995).
140. Steven P. Garvey, The Emotional Economy of CapitalSentencing, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 26 (2000).
141. Id. at 64.
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"madman" or "vicious like a mad animal."142 The type of offender most likely to fit
the "madman" category, of course, is one who exhibits symptoms of mental illness
at the time of the offense. Even an offender with mental retardation is likely to be
less feared and thus less likely to be irrationally sentenced to death than the person
with significant mental illness. Indeed, the researchers found that while jurors were
"likely to have felt sympathy or pity" for people with both types of disability, they
were more likely to be simultaneously "disgusted or repulsed" only by the latter type
of defendant. 143
Now that people with mental retardation cannot be executed, execution of people
who have significant mental illness at the time of the offense is difficult to defend
on rational grounds, whether the forum is judicial, legislative, or executive.' The
primary reason such executions continue is a disproportionate fear of people with
mental illness. Prohibiting imposition of the death penalty on these people would
dramatically highlight the irrationality of that fear.

142. Id. at 59-61 (thls. 8,9).
143. Id. at 56 (tbl. 7).
144. As Connecticut has demonstrated, legislative action is possible. See supra note 41. Similarly, state
governors, through implementation of executive clemency, can recognize the mitigating effects of mental illness.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Rapaport, Straight Is the Gate: Capital Clemency in the United States from Gregg to Atkins,
33 N.M. L. REV. 349 (2003) (describing Governor Gilmore's 1999 commutation of the death sentence of Calvin
Eugene Swann, who allegedly suffered from schizophrenia at time of offense, see Swann v. Virginia, 441 S.E.2d
195, 203 (Va. 1994), and clearly did at time of commutation).

